Xinjiang: China’s Achilles Heel
In yet another episode of ethnic violence, more than 180 people have died in the riots in China’s minority province of Xinjiang. At the same time, the death toll is bound to rise as more than hundred are critically injured according to the official media. Besides the death count, these riots have left about a thousand injured and led to a massive destruction of property in the Urumqi and Kashgar. The riots took place after a protest march by ethnic Uighur people. The protestors were demanding justice for the two Uighur workers who died during the ethnic clashes with Han workers in a toy factory in the Guangdong province in June. These clashes were caused by rumoured atrocities by Uighur workers that were never proved.
The violent conflict between the majority nationality Han and the minority Uighur is an important issue in itself but more than that, it is a symptom of a larger problem that the People’s Republic has at its hand. China has 56 ethnic groups identified as minority nationalities or ‘Minzu’. The majority nationality, Han comprises about 92 percent of the Chinese population while the remaining 8 percent is a mix of the minority nationalities. The issue become a problematic for the state, as the nationalities are located in China’s border provinces that are underdeveloped but have rich energy resources. Most importantly, the minority nationalities share ethnic ties across the border regions some of which are nation states after the split of the former Soviet Union. China sees this as a cause of concern as it is also facing ethnic nationalism that challenges Beijing’s rule in these provinces.
In general, the Party State’s approach has oscillated between accommodative and assimilative towards the minority nationalities. However, recognising the separatist threat since 1990s, China has taken serious steps to develop these provinces and has tried to assimilate the populace with the mainstream even if the state’s approach has retained a pluralist façade. The pluralist appearance included the creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), concessions in the birth control policy to minority nationalities and so on. The actions on ground clearly indicate the approach towards assimilation. In the name of the development, a large number of Han migrants have settled in the minority regions. This was inevitable since the people from minority nationalities lacked the educational qualifications that suited the modernisation projects. But what this has meant is that the sense of resentment felt by the local minorities has increased. They believe that the region has developed but the people belonging to minority communities have not benefited from the development whereas the Han immigrants have tended to reap the benefits of the regional development. Therefore, the Han neighbourhoods have been attacked in ethnic conflicts more than once. This shows the anger among the local populace about the Hannization of the minority regions. Similarly, the Uighur migrants to southern and other parts of China faced similar problems as they usually got low paying high-risk jobs le adding to serious sense of disaffection and alienation. In addition, in many parts if the country, Uighurs have been blamed for petty crimes and have been punished without evidence in many cases. This has lent strength to the extremist and militant factions of the Uighur population.
The state’s efforts towards development have been insensitive towards the cultural heritage of the local people. Various monuments and sites of historical importance were destroyed previously to develop infrastructure projects. There have also been nuclear tests conducted the region that have threatened local life in certain areas. The local language, something that could have eased the Uighurs’ entry into the mainstream, also has been ignored in the scheme of things. Thus the development efforts of the Chinese state are beginning to be counter productive in the province of Xinjiang.
The Chinese State’s response to the protests and subsequent rioting is also interesting. While it has allowed the images of the riots to go out to the international community, it has blocked internet and telephone lines in Xinjiang. Had this been an entirely internal issue, one could expect the state to ban the images and news from spreading. But the Chinese State has tried to project the recent violence as a domestic conflict fuelled by some elements of the international community. It has consistently blamed the World Uighur Congress (WUC) as having instigated the violence by spreading misinformation. What the state wants by publicising the riots allegedly caused by the external hand is the banning of the WUC which operates as a legal entity in most of the Europe and United States. They are particularly targeting the exiled Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer. This is in line with the Chinese State’s efforts of treating the Xinjiang extremism as part of the global terrorism, the line which China has consistently taken since the idea of fight against global terrorism came to forefront in the wake of 9/11. In case of Tibet, the world accuses China of human rights violations therefore news of unrest and protests from Tibet tend to be controlled and filtered and on the other hand, China uses media to project Xinjiang issue as terrorism by sharing images of violence and destruction.
The protests are far from over yet as there are reports of fresh demonstrations in the town of Kashgar in Xinjiang. Also worrying are the unofficial reports of the death toll being about 600. These protests also remind one of the last year’s instances of Tibetan protests which had rocked the leadership as the nation was preparing to host the Beijing Olympics. The Chinese leadership is adding fuel to the fire by disclosing the ethnic distribution of the deaths. Here it must learn from the Indian media on the issues regarding riot reporting.
Embarrassing as they are, protests in the minority regions are becoming more and more violent and thus pose serious challenges to the leadership of the People’s Republic of China.
A slightly different version of this article is here on the IPCS website.
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