Civil Military Relations and Media

Does China's Economic Power translate into Great Power Status?

Below is the full version of the article I published in September 2010 on Opinion  Asia. Since the website is not functional any more, sharing it with the readers of this blog. I welcome your comments on this idea!

In the recent times, the news of People’s Republic of China becoming the World’s second largest economy in terms of GDP has caught the imagination of observers of China. If the predictions are to be true, then China will become the world’s largest economy sometime in the next couple of decades. Whether about something good or bad, numbers and statistic about the People’s Republic have always been awe-inspiring. However, the question that could and should be asked at this important juncture is about the meaning of these numbers. Since there are many caveats to the present China rise theory, the ability of the economic status to transform China into a great power has been questioned.

Therefore, one must ask as to what China would bring to the world order as the Great Power? There are two dimensions of the great power status, ability and willingness to demonstrate that ability. Moreover, sometimes the demonstrative effect has the longer lasting impact that the ability itself. As one observer recently argued with reference to supposed race between India and China, it is not about which of these gets there first but about which one leaves a lasting impact. Similarly, it may not matter as to when China finally achieves the Great Power status but how it gets there and what tools it has to help it survive in that league.

Earlier great power transformations have occurred based on innovation. Most of these innovations have been game changers, not only in terms of changing the equations between the leaders and rest but also in terms of the rules of the game itself. By doing this, the rising powers were able to maintain not just the power they had but they were also able to appropriate the system to suit the nature of their power. The simplest example of this would be the rise of the United States to the Great Power status and the subsequent creation of the Bretton Woods system that sustained the supremacy of the capitalist system and until recently retained the value of the US Dollar as the prime trading currency. During the war, it had developed not only the nuclear weapons but also had the system that could deliver the weapons to the target locations. Earlier colonial powers had not only found and conquered the trading regions but they also mastered the oceanic roots that safeguarded their trade. Therefore, at the simplest level, it can be argued that Great Power status can be achieved only if a country is having twin superior qualities that complement each other and give them distinct advantage over the rest of the states. It must then be asked as to what China has to offer that is unique as well as relatively rare that it has already mastered? As of now, there are no definitive answers to this question since China’s relations with the world are complex.

The willingness to demonstrate the ability has equal impact as the ability. However, Chinese commentators have been cautious about the praise of their country’s new economic status. They want to avoid any delusion of China having already risen. They know that China has a long way to go before it could be called a true Great Power. However, demonstrative impact of Great Power status is not to the external world alone, its domestic utility is also equally significant. Expressions of Chinese nationalism through hostile protests of the 1990s against the US and Japan have had serious impact on China, which is continues through the jingoistic public opinions expressed on the internet that is remotely against anything the People’s Republic. In a deideologised society, nationalism could be the tool that is deployed again. Therefore, it could be argued that the recent spat over the ‘core interest’ was one in which the world offered China a ready opportunity to literally test the waters for the demonstrative aspect of its great power status.

The first example of China’s power capabilities was its role in helping in the recovery after the Asian crash of 1997. That time its economy was still not integrated with the world economy as much as it is today. Therefore, it could play the role of the saviour to the smaller non-dependent economies. Contrast this with the crash of 2008 when China’s deeper engagement with the US made it look like entanglement limiting China’s ability to play big brother. Therefore, China’s ability to flex its space is limited and complexity of its relations makes it less willing to demonstrate that capacity.

Therefore, instances like the tussle over the Yellow Sea would continue till China finds its trump card. On the other hand, the world will continue to criticise China and its belligerence because its ambitions can not be accommodated in the existing order of things. Till then US and China would continue to play the game of one-upmanship. As long as there is no threat escalation, the world will have to learn to live with it.