A Year since Xinjiang Riots: Regional Consequences
 |
5th July marked the first anniversary of the ethnic riots in Urumqi, capital of China’s Xinjiang province that is home to the minority Muslim ethnicity Uighurs. These riots had highlighted the disharmony in the People’s Republic that has projected the idea of harmony in every imaginable field. Therefore, the ethnic riot in which about two hundred people lost their lives was a big embarrassment for the leadership of China. Besides the domestic policy implications, the 2009 riots have had serious implications for China’s foreign relations in Asia.
Part of the Chinese strategy in Xinjiang is rapid economic development, which the leadership feels would become the driver of peace and stability in the region. This was clearly articulated in the White Paper on Xinjiang that came out after the riots of July 2009. At the same time, geographically Xinjiang is at a location that is critical for China’s relations with Central Asia and South Asia. These twin long term goals drive Chinese external policy in the region. Within this framework, there are two drivers behind China’s new proactive foreign policy in the region. One of the components of China’s expanding interest in the region has been its quest for energy security; the other is the linkages of the extremist elements in Xinjiang and Pakistan based Taliban.
For the rapidly developing China, diversification of its energy sources has been the central component of energy security policy. China is developing energy cooperation with the Central Asian republics for energy supply through pipelines. Therefore, resource diplomacy has been its method of reaching out to the countries in the region. Xinjiang is the receiving and distribution point for China’s oil and gas imports from Central Asia. Other natural resources also become important for China. China’s investments of $ 3.4 billion in the Aynak copper mines in Afghanistan are also part of this strategy. China plans to construct a railway line for direct linkage with Afghanistan. It also plans infrastructure development along the Wakhan corridor to exploit economic opportunities and mineral resources in Afghanistan. It also helps the Chinese western development strategy of economic development of Xinjiang and Tibet. However, stability in Xinjiang is of critical importance for this plan to succeed. Therefore, China watched very closely the political situation in Kyrgyzstan earlier this year as anti government riots led to the downfall of the government. Kyrgyzstan has an important place in China’s Central Asian strategy. Chinese government feared that if the Uighur population in Kyrgyzstan were to get involved in the anti government riots, it could have had implications for peace and stability in Xinjiang. In addition, the Chinese population in Kyrgyzstan has been the target of protests against economic hardships. Therefore, China’s faces the dual task of economically engaging the region and ensuring domestic stability as far as role of Central Asia is concerned.
Given the fact that Xinjiang is in the border region and since it has socioeconomic connections across the borders, solving the problem involves external actors, mainly Pakistan. China knows very well that the extremists Uighur separatists have linkages with the Pakistan Taliban. Therefore, in the past few days, China has taken its all weather friendship with Pakistan to a new level by agreeing to supply two nuclear power reactors, perhaps in return for action to severe the fundamentalist link. Very recently, China made a public demand seeking Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting Uighur separatism. Beginning 1st July, China and Pakistan are holding a joint military exercise “Friendship 2010” which is aimed at joint counter terrorism drills. This exercise will last for ten days. The symbolic importance of the timing of this exercise to coincide with the first anniversary of the riots can not be overlooked. Moreover, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari is slated to visit China later this week for talks with the Chinese leadership.
Implications for India
In the great power game’s South Asia theatre, where the United States wants Pakistan’s cooperation in its war against terror, it seems to have looked the other way as far as the China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation is concerned. It now becomes clear that these matters would have dominated the US China Dialogue on South Asia that took place in May, in which the great power game of convenience unfolded. For the US and China, Pakistan is more important at this stage than ever before. Even as Pakistan seems to be leveraging this instrumental value, for India, this stage of the great game has caused a serious headache, as Pakistan’s proliferation record seems to be ignored once again. On the other hand, if the US has assured China a greater role in Afghanistan in the post-exit period then it could bring its own set of complications. India’s only card would be to expose Pakistan’s double speak on terrorism if it is willing to do more for China’s demands than what it has done for India. If that happens, India can consider a change of strategy on terrorism’s external linkages. In Central Asia, India can exploit the limitations of the Chinese strategy and involve local empowerment as a component of its economic engagement.
This Commentary was recently published on the IPCS website.
Comments