Thus it appears as if after pulling out a credible Iran deal, one which has
enough checks and balances as well as involvement of other like-minded
countries, The US President Donald Trump
gave away a lot in Singapore in return little verifiable in return from Kim. It
appears as if North Korea, a de-facto nuclear power, is the bigger winner out
of the Singapore summit. Donald Trump did have his moment of unilateral glory
in Singapore but if Japan and South Korea came out on top, then they would have
more reasons to worry. Moreover, China’s headaches would rise were they to act
on those worries.
Until the Singapore
summit, Donald Trump and Kim Jong un had fairly same reasons for direct talks.
For Trump it was his desire to stamp the American supremacy. He sought to show
China its place, after years of engagement policy by Obama by first completely
discrediting the Six Party talks which were not only China-initiated but also
China-led. He used social media on one hand and back channels on the other for
this purpose. China’s waning decisive powers were also showcased when the DPRK tested
its ballistic missile Hwasong-15 barely after Beijing’s special envoy
Song Tao landed back after a visit to Pyongyang.
On
the other hand, for Kim, meeting with President Trump was a statement of
status, of recognition of his country’s capacity and for him personally as
having achieved something unprecedented that could not be by his father or
grandfather. For a state and for a
leader that is without much direct diplomatic communication with the outside
world this is a big step in gaining international legitimacy.
The
joint statement signed by Donald Trump and Kim Jong un leaves a lot to
interpretation and that is what the success or failure of this process will
depend on. For example, the phrase “complete denuclerization of the Korean
peninsula” is an open ended phrase and can mean differently depending on
whether one is reading it. A classic egg or chicken dilemma is not unlikely as
a consequence.
For
China though, no matter what the outcome of the summit, it has both positives
and negatives to think about. For starters, China is likely to say that the
joint statement is nothing but an affirmation of the policy of “double freeze”
that it has been recommending for more than a year now. Having sorted out the
relations with Kim over two “informal” meetings, China is likely to believe
that it retained its stake over the process and that Kim got away with a less
stringent deal than expected.
On
the other hand, what happens to the US security alliance systems in the region
is a bigger question from a long-term perspective. Trump’s unilateral decision
to halt the joint exercises with South Korea and also to call it expensive and very
provocative and his wish-list to see all of the 32,000 American troops home
would have come as a surprise for Seoul. Tokyo would also be watching the developments
closely because there are approximately 40,000 US troops stationed in the more
than 20 bases that US has in Japan. At present, Japan and South Korea face
threats not only from North Korea and have their concerns vis-à-vis China, they
also have disputes over islands and maritime territories between themselves. In
addition, there are unsettled issued over history and its interpretation.
In
addition, the US is likely to prioritize elimination of North Korea’s
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) first before denucelarisation as
such. While this eliminates direct threats to continental US, it does little to
assure Japan of its security. Japan’s response in such scenario is likely to be
a faster paced and more proactive self-defense policy, which is already more
proactive than it was a decade ago. This will surely follow an activist
security posturing on part of South Korea and if that were to happen, the East
Asian security architecture would face an unprecedented rupture.
While
China detests the fact that the US controls the East Asian security
architecture and drives the process of it, it is neither willing nor capable of
burdening more responsibility for the same. Rather, stability driven by
overarching American presence has allowed Beijing to be assured of its
immediate security environment, even if does not want to acknowledge it as
such, and to pursue strategic goals in form of BRI and “support bases” in East
Africa. Thus, as East Asian arms race would be Beijing’s biggest nightmare at
the moment.
There is no escaping the
fact that the Singapore deal has brought out more questions than answers and
these questions can dictate the East Asian security scenario in the days to
come.
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