For a long time now, India and People’s Republic of
China have had uneasy bilateral relationship. In addition to the conflicted
history, instances in the recent past have made it extremely difficult for both
the countries to set the terms of relationships in place so that the
relationship could be taken forward. Instead, what the two have had are the events
that have threatened to derail any form of momentum without warning. From the
news of trans-boundary intrusions to the denial of proper visas to the
residents of Jammu and Kashmir to the denial of any form of visa to the Indian
Army’s northern commander, and to an Indian Air Force officer from Arunachal
Pradesh in the recent past, China has undertaken activities that have time and
again challenged India’s sovereignty by acting against the norms of good
international conduct. Consequently, each time the highest leadership has met
in the recent past, they have only worked as firefighters by saying that
despite repeated acts of belligerence from certain sectors of power they do not
see each other as stepping on each other’s toes, at least not as yet. However,
there is a danger that India’s accommodative behaviour vis-à-vis China might be
seen as a sign of its weakness and it may not augur well from a long term point
of view.
The argument here is that the Yiwu episode, where two
Indian representatives of a Yemeni trader had to undergo illegal detention and
threat to life, not only exemplifies the difficulties of doing unorganized
business in China but also showcases difficulties of dealing with a rising
China as far as India is concerned. Therefore, in some ways, the Yiwu episode
is a symptom of the larger predicament of the India China relations. Like in
Yiwu, legal and convention based method is not being followed by one of the
actors at the bilateral level, the PRC, that believes in using its power
towards arm-twisting the relatively weaker partner into submission. On the
other hand, time and again the other actor, India, has tended to act in a manner
to give peace another chance. India has chosen to act in a peaceful manner,
perhaps believing it as a better alternative to confrontation.
However, it is questionable whether the world views
India’s approach in the same way. Afterall, India was well within its rights to
register stronger protests than it seems to have done. The Indian government
also has some explaining to do in the context of its decision of continuing
with the exchange visit by a smaller defence delegation after the denial of
visa to an officer of the Indian Air Force from the state of Arunachal Pradesh.
India’s decision to go ahead with the delegation’s visit is questionable from
the regional posturing point of view, since one actor’s peace can well be
viewed as weakness by another. Thus, from the point of view of audit, it must
be asked whether this embarrassment was avoidable in the first place.
Chinese
Belligerence and Regional Consequences
However, this does not augur well for the power
relations in Asia as such. If the smaller countries in the region begin to
believe that if India could meet such predicament then at the geostrategic
level they would be much less willing to believe China as a peacefully rising power.
Therefore they might be tempted to bandwagon alongside another power to secure
their national interests. To that extent this seems to be happening with the
return of the US with defence agreements with various countries of the
Southeast Asian region.
From the point of view of the Indian national interest
in the region, this set of cyclical pattern will cause double whammy. Asian
geostrategic order seems to be setting in a pattern of acts that seem to
include belligerence of China, India’s patience in dealing with China (or
hesitance to take hard stance from another perspective) and sustained and
increasing US engagement pushing further militarization on part of the PRC.
What it does for India is that it does not send right signals either to China
or to other smaller Asian countries. India cannot hope to achieve peace with
China by sending a wrong message to other smaller countries in Asia that might
have been interested in partnering with India to balance China’s rise.
While in itself Yiwu is symbolic of the structure of
trade in China, its diplomatic consequences are symbolic of China’s
assertiveness. Coupled with the latest visa row, it symbolises the power
relations in Asia. However, as far as India is concerned, taking short term
view just to sustain peace might be counterproductive from a long term
aspirations of becoming an influential actor in the new world order.
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